Phase 1
Strategic Shock
Complete
Phase 1
Strategic Shock
Complete
Phase 2
Counterforce Degradation
Current
Phase 3
Regime Destabilization
Upcoming
Phase 4
Political Revolution
Upcoming
Cumulative capability-degradation estimate. The gate marks the threshold ceiling; the phase is met only when the entire current band clears it.
Aircraft hangars are not a tracked capability lane, while operations centers, drone storage, logistics, and maritime targets overlap categories already scored. The public reporting does not justify another percentage increase. No fresh source-backed capability breakpoint was recorded for this lane.
Air defenses · heldno change
No fresh source-backed capability breakpoint was recorded for this lane.
Command network · heldno change
No fresh source-backed capability breakpoint was recorded for this lane.
Drone degradation · heldno change
No fresh source-backed capability breakpoint was recorded for this lane.
Missile degradation · heldno change
No fresh source-backed capability breakpoint was recorded for this lane.
Naval disruption · heldno change
No fresh source-backed capability breakpoint was recorded for this lane.
Underground sites · heldno change
No fresh source-backed capability breakpoint was recorded for this lane.
Phase 2 total · heldno change
No fresh source-backed capability breakpoint was recorded for this lane.
Iran has increasingly combined internal control and indirect pressure with direct state action, but it has not completed a durable shift away from sustained counter-strike.
Repeated strikes against command, logistics, communications, storage, and launch-support systems support partial degradation, but Iran continues to regenerate meaningful attacks.
Iran continues to demonstrate the ability to conduct coordinated one-way attack-drone operations during active hostilities.
Iran continues to retain strategically meaningful coercive leverage over shipping and traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.
There has not been a sustained period during active hostilities in which Iran was unable or unwilling to conduct meaningful missile salvos.
The regime shifts from sustained counter-strike toward residual pressure, proxies, and internal control
Iran has increasingly combined internal control and indirect pressure with direct state action, but it has not completed a durable shift away from sustained counter-strike.
Underground launch and command nodes show a declining ability to regenerate attacks
Repeated strikes against command, logistics, communications, storage, and launch-support systems support partial degradation, but Iran continues to regenerate meaningful attacks.
Drone attacks fall to sporadic harassment rather than coordinated waves
Iran continues to demonstrate the ability to conduct coordinated one-way attack-drone operations during active hostilities.
Maritime coercion loses strategic effect
Iran continues to retain strategically meaningful coercive leverage over shipping and traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.
Multiple consecutive days with no meaningful missile salvos
There has not been a sustained period during active hostilities in which Iran was unable or unwilling to conduct meaningful missile salvos.