JangIranIran Conflict Projections

Air defenses (held) 0%

Held because air defenses were already in the passed zone and no same-day milestone added another move.

Command network (held) 0%

Held because continued Tehran strikes were not tied to a discrete fresh leadership or command-node hit in the public reporting used here.

Drone launches (held) 0%

Held because no drone-production or drone-launch milestone appeared in the reporting used for this pass.

Missile launches (held) 0%

Held because continued strike pressure inside Iran was not specific enough to confirm a new launcher or storage degradation step.

Naval disruption (moved_up) +1%

Moved up because limited real tanker passage through Hormuz modestly weakened the case that Iran was maintaining a perfectly effective denial regime.

Phase 2 total (moved_up) +1%

Moved up because the maritime lane is a load-bearing bucket and a small maritime gain should register in the cumulative total.

Underground sites (held) 0%

Held because strikes near Bushehr kept pressure alive but did not publicly prove new hardened-site degradation.

The regime shifts from sustained counter-strike toward residual pressure, proxies, and internal controlPartial

Fresh strikes in Tehran kept pressure on the regime's internal apparatus high, while the regime still retained direct retaliatory options. That preserves Partial: the shift exists, but it is incomplete.

Status did not advance beyond Partial because direct state missile and drone retaliation never disappeared; the regime had not fully fallen back to residual pressure and internal-control tools as its primary mode.

Underground launch and command nodes show a declining ability to regenerate attacksPartial

Fresh strikes in Tehran and near Bushehr kept pressure alive in both command and strategic infrastructure, but there was still no evidence that regeneration had collapsed into only residual or ineffective retaliation.

Status did not advance beyond Partial because Iran continued to regenerate meaningful retaliation after the bunkers, launch infrastructure, and command nodes came under heavier pressure.

Drone attacks fall to sporadic harassment rather than coordinated wavesNot yet

Late-period command and missile events still did not provide the specific kind of multi-day evidence needed to say drones had fallen to mere sporadic harassment. The trigger stays Not yet.

Status stayed Not yet because the public evidence showed degraded drone output, not a clear multi-day pattern in which only sporadic harassment remained.

Maritime coercion loses strategic effectNot yet

Limited tanker passage was real, but traffic was still far below normal and mine-laying threats remained active. That keeps the trigger at Not yet despite the small positive movement in the naval bucket.

Status stayed Not yet because the maritime threat remained strategically significant: throughput was still heavily impaired, the insurance and energy effect was still real, and Iran retained credible coercive leverage.

Multiple consecutive days with no meaningful missile salvosNot yet

There was still no verified multi-day no-salvo sequence. The trigger remained Not yet.

Status stayed Not yet because the conflict never produced the required run of multiple consecutive days without meaningful missile salvos.

Public reporting — Two India-bound LPG tankers transit Hormuz under heavy constraints

Limited but real tanker passage suggested some throughput was still possible even while the strait remained under severe constraint.

Public reporting — Israeli strike pressure continues in Tehran

Continuing strikes in Tehran showed the pressure campaign inside Iran was still active on March 23.

Public reporting — Strikes reported near Bushehr

Reports of strikes near Bushehr added to the sense of continued pressure on nuclear-related geography, though not enough to prove a new underground-site move.